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THE INDIGENT ASSIGNEE
By WilLim R. SWEENEY

Oft-times a legal oak petrified by age and revered by reiteration stands
accepted by all as sufficient in itself without the slightest reflection about the
roots from which it sprung or the inconsistency between it and its surroundings. In California such a legal landmark is the rule: The lessee's
obligation to pay rent, which arises from the occupancy of premises as a
tenant, is not terminated by the assignment of his estate. To be relieved of

further obligation the lessee must, in addition, secure the lessor's consent to
the assignment. 1
The courts and textwriters have accepted this rule as so well settled, that
neither of them has considered it necessary to trace the origin or reason from
which the rule stems. Nor does an occasion frequently arise which would
encourage the court or counsel to seek the reason of the rule in order to
guide its application to the facts presented. To be applicable, the rule
requires a factual situation in which a lessee (1) is obligated to pay rent
only by privity of estate; (2) has assigned his estate without the express
or implied consent of the lessor, and; (3) is claiming that the assignment
has released him from further obligation.
A brief consideration of the first two necessary components will illustrate the reasons why the requisite pattern of facts so seldom occurs.
If the lessee is bound by privity of contract as well as privity of estate,
he remains bound to the lessor by his contractual obligations notwithstanding
the lessor's consent to the assignment,2 and the quoted rule is immaterial to
the determination of the case. Since the Statute of Frauds, as adopted in
California,3 requires a lease for more than a single year to be in writing,
a contractual obligation usually results. In fact, the California courts have
uniformly implied a contractual obligation either from the words "reserving
a rent," or from the general tenor of the writing required by the Statute
of Frauds.' Thus, as a practical matter, a lessee bound only by privity of
estate is rare.
Further, the courts are prone to imply the lessor's consent to the assignment; the usual case being the acceptance of rent from the assignee. A striking illustration of the extension of this tendency is the case of Guarantee
'Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, 146 Pac. 638 (1915), quoting Tiffany on "Real Property"
and citing Consumers Ice Company v. Bixler, 84 Md. 437, 35 AtL. 1086 (1896), which contains a
good statement of the rule.

'See De Hart v. Allen, 26 Cal. 2d 829, 161 P. 2d 453 (1945),

and the citation of authority therein.

'Code Civ. Proc., § 1973.

'Samuels v. Ottinger, supra, contains a discussion of typical cases. See, also, Timm v. Brown,
78 Cal App. 2d 609, 178 P. 2d 10 (1947).
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Trust and Savings Bank v. Marsh,' wherein the court found service by the
lessor upon the assignee of the statutory three-day notice to pay rent or
surrender 6 constituted recognition of the assignees as tenants. Thus, the
propensity of the courts to imply a contractual obligation and to find consent
to the assignment prevents a sharp contest which would encourage discussion
of the reason and justice of the rule stated supra.
Before dismissing as unimportant the rule being considered in this discussion a comparison with the rule applicable to a similar situation should be
made. The situation referred to is that of an assignee who does not assume
the contractual obligation of his lessee-assignor.
The relationship between a lessor and a lessee bound only by privity
of estate, and that between a lessor and an assignee who does not assume a
contractual obligation is identical. The obligations of both the lessee and
his assignee spring from privity of estate and differ only in that one preceded
the other in point of time. This identity would seem to require that a uniform
rule be applicable to both relationships. But such is not the case!
In contrast to the lessee, the assignee may relieve himself from further
liability to pay rent by assignment alone; in fact, the California courts have
held him to be released by abandoning possession without assignment.7
The light of judicial opinion does not shine upon the reason which
begot the inconsistency between these two rules applicable to persons whose
relationship to a lessor is identical. But if the cases fail to disclose the
reason, they serve to illustrate the effects of the rule-effects as contradictory as the rules themselves.
Under these rules the lessee remains bound notwithstanding the assignment until the lessor consents to accept a substitute; whereas, the assignee
may free himself without consent, and without regard to the irresponsibility
of his assignee. Thus, while the lessee guarantees the assignee's performance
until the lessor accepts him, the assignee can with impunity pay an indigent
beggar to accept his estate and its attendant burdens.
But why, it may be asked, should the hue and cry of injustice be raised
now when in 1860 Chief Justice Field in Johnson v. Sherman' foisted upon
the California law a rule which has since become well settled? The reason
is that upon critical reexamination of the problem, the attitude which

'40 Cal. App. 292, 180 Pac. 622 (1919).
6
Code Civ. Proc., § 1161.
'4 So. Cal. L. Rev. 343, at 350, wherein the authorities are discussed, and subjected to proper
criticism. Hence, this aspect of the problem need not be considered here.
'15 Cal 287 (1860), the leading case. Affirmed: Dengler v. Michelson, 76 Cal. 125, 18 Pac. 138
(1888), and followed thereafter.
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prompted Chief Justice Field to commend assignment to an indigent beggar9
might well be changed.
The case of Shea et al. v. Leonis et al."° is the first indication that the
rule of Johnson v. Sherman might be modified. In the Shea case the California Supreme Court held, in determining a demurrer to be insufficient, that
a corporate assignee of a lease could not escape its obligation to pay rent
by assigning the lease to a corporation without other assets, and which was
specially formed for the purpose of taking the assignment by the assignor
who beneficially owned all of its stock. The court said to recognize the
separate entity of the specially formed corporation would promote fraud
and injustice. Hence the purported assignment was held to be ineffective
and the liability of the old corporation to be unchanged.
The case of Johnson v. Sherman was held not to be controlling under
these facts as the defendant urged, and thus in this limited situation the court
has refused to permit assignment to one without assets and against whom
the recovery of compensation for the occupation of premises withheld is
practically impossible.
It is true the scope of this case is narrow. It is likewise true that the
theory relied on is that the corporate entity will not be recognized where
the recognition will sanction fraud and injustice. But with all, it is a basis
from which may spring the contention that if it would sanction fraud and
promote injustice to recognize the entity of a corporate assignee which is
without assets, it would likewise sanction fraud and promote injustice to
recognize the validity of an assignment to an insolvent natural person. The
injustice which usually results from the assignment to an indigent natural
person is that possession is withheld from the lessor by one from whom no
compensation therefor can be secured and during the withholding his property is subjected to the risk of harm by irresponsible persons who cannot be
made to respond in damages. To bring an end to this injustice the lessor
must bring a legal action for recovery of possession with its consequent loss
of time and expenditure of money.
Thus, perhaps the rule requiring consent of the lessor has survived,
though its reason be lost in antiquity, because it works justice; and perhaps
its application should and -will be extended to include those cases in which
an assignee assigns to an insolvent.

'In reference to the defendant Justice Fields said, "his conduct was the dictate of common
prudence, such as any man in his senses would have pursued."
1014 Cal. 2d 666, 96 P. 2d 332 (1939), prior opinion 92 P. 2d 400 (1939).

